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I. INTRODUCTION
You have the right to remain silent; you have the right to an attorney.'
Nearly everyone recognizes this phrase from the landmark case Miranda v.
Arigona,2 which demonstrates the significance of the attorney-client
relationship and the right to consult with counsel confidentially. This
Comment discusses the pending class action lawsuit, Ausfin Lawyers Guild v.
Securus Technologies, Inc., which is currently before the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. The
plaintiffs, a group of Austin criminal defense attorneys, allege the Travis
County Sheriff's Office illegally recorded attorney-client telephone calls
and turned them over to prosecutors. Such actions constitute a violation
of the attorney-client privilege and infringe upon the constitutional rights
of pretrial detainees. The plaintiffs plan to advance arguments grounded
in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments' of the
1. Statements stemming from custodial interrogation, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, may
not be used by prosecutors unless the interrogators demonstrate procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)
(holding appropriate and effective procedural safeguards are to be used to protect one's right against
self-incrimination and to inform a defendant of the right to counsel).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See generally Austin Lawyers Guild v. Securus Techs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-366, 2014 WL
1689693 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2014) (providing the plaintiffs complaint).
4. Constitutional and statutory provisions protect the criminal defendant at every stage of the
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United States Constitution and in alleged violations of federal and state
wiretap laws.
The lawsuit encompasses a myriad of issues that affect the attorney-
client relationship such as the privileges it entails and the degree of
confidence and trust between lawyer and client. Attorney-client privilege
is one of the oldest concepts in our legal system, yet it is still unclear from
where exactly it derives and how it interplays with the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.s It is clear, however, that fostering
open communication and trust between a client and his or her attorney is
of utmost importance if the justice system is to operate effectively. This
pending case also raises ethical considerations: What is a defense attorney
to do when the prosecution uses illegally obtained evidence? How will
prosecutors be held responsible for their unethical actions? If the
allegations against the defendants prove true, the court must not only
afford the plaintiffs relief but also send a message to state officials and
prosecutors that the attorney-client relationship is not to be improperly
intruded upon.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law privilege for
confidential information.' The Supreme Court of the United States has
long recognized the existence of the privilege and understood it is needed
for attorneys to be able to advocate effectively on behalf of their clients.'
proceedings and impose important limits on the government's ability to gather and present evidence.
See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedes, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 729
(1999) (reiterating the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution impose important
procedural limits on the authority of the government to gather evidence and conduct a criminal trial).
The federal Constitution provides arrestees and pretrial detainees with baseline protections that state
constitutions cannot sink below; therefore, a state can only add to the protections afforded to
arrestees and pretrial detainees. See Caroline Davidson, State Constitutions and the Humane Treatment of
Armstees and Pretrial Detainees, 19 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 18 (2014) (clarifying states "can only add to
the protections of the federal [qonstitution").
5. See Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibity of Fruits of Breached Eidentiay Priileger: The Importance of
Adversarial Fairness, Part Culpabity, and Fear of Immunity, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 961, 994 (2003) (asserting
confidential communications between attorneys and clients may be protected under the "Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments').
6. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (recognizing the historical roots of
the attorney-client privilege and the importance of maintaining confidentiality between a client and
an attorney); see aLso Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidenial Communication Between Lanyer and Client,
16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1927) (noting in Roman times, out of loyalty to the families they served,
attorneys were considered incompetent to testify against clients).
7. In 1888, the Court in Hunt v. Blackburn held:
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The American legal system largely developed from the English legal
system,' and the concept of attorney-client privilege, as we know it, is said
to have originated during the Elizabethan period.' However, there appear
to be no American cases on the subject until the 1820s.10 In the 1970s,
the Supreme Court held confidential disclosures made by clients to
attorneys to obtain legal services are privileged and the privilege only
applies where necessary to accomplish its purpose." The privilege is,
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and attorney is
founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons
having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)
(recognizing "the imperative need for confidence and trust" for the advocate and counselor to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation so the professional mission may be
carried out).
8. See Allen Dillard Boyer, 'Understandin, Authority, and Will": Sir Edward Coke and the
EkZabethan Ongins ofJudicial Retiew, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43, 90 (1997) (explaining the influence of Lord
Coke's writings on judicial review in 1647 in the General Court of Massachusetts); see also Harold J.
Berman, The Origins of Histoica/Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 10 YALE L.J. 1651, 1652-53 (1994)
(noting the ever present effects of historical jurisprudence in modern-day English and American law).
9. See R. Aubrey Davis III, Big Brother the Sneak or Big Brother the Sentry: Does a New Bureau of
Prisons Regulation Truly Abrogate the Attorney-Chent Privilege?, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 163, 171 (2004)
(explaining the attorney-client privilege existed before the Constitution and originally belonged to the
lawyer as a method to protect his honor); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perrpective on the
Attorney-Cent Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1070 (1978) (stating Elizabethan cases do refer to the
attorney-client privilege, and although some early cases refer to the privilege as being that of a
lawyer, as the rule developed, it now serves to protect the client and his secrets). Today, the privilege
belongs to the client, and the lawyer cannot use it for her own protection because the privilege is only
available in circumstances where it is necessary for the client's protection. See Katherine Ruzenski,
Note, Balancing Fundamental Civil liberties and the Need for Increased Homeland Security: The Attorney-Client
Privilege After September 11th, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 467, 491 (2005) (discussing a case in
which an attorney attempted to assert the attorney-client privilege to serve her own interests).
10. See Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185, 188 (1829) (holding the attorney-client privilege belonged
to the client and was to apply to communications from the consultation to the termination of the
suit). In 1831, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held:
The privilege which he claims, is the privilege, not of the attorney, but of the client, and is
founded on this consideration, that there would be no safety in dealing with mankind, if persons
employed in transactions were compelled to state that which they have learned only by this
species of confidence.
Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89, 97 (1831). The privilege reached American shores in 1760 and
was identical to the doctrine as applied in England, except for the limiting requirement that the
communication must have been made in anticipation of litigation. See Davis, sapra note 9, at 172
(providing commentary on the historical origins of the attorney-client privilege and its development
into modern jurisprudence).
11. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (limiting the attorney-client privilege
so it protects only disclosures made to obtain informed legal advice).
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however, subject o a number of recognized exceptions.1
III. WHAT IS COVERED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE?
The classic formulation of the attorney--client privilege is:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.' 3
This formulation of the attorney-client privilege contains certain
limitations.'4  For example, the communication must be made in the
course of seeking legal advice,'5 and the attorney-client privilege cannot
be abused for the purpose of seeking advice regarding future
wrongdoing.'6 Furthermore, the client may waive the evidentiary privilege
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) (listing the
exceptions to the rule of confidentiality between attorney and client); see also TEX. R. EVID. 503(d)
(listing the Texas exceptions to the attorney-client privilege).
13. Lloyd B. Snyder, Is Attorng-Client Confidentiality Necessay?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477,
482-83 (2002). Nearly every judge and lawyer is familiar with or recognizes the name John Henry
Wigmore and the monumental treatise he wrote on the topic of evidence law, which promulgated the
formulation of attorney-client privilege. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: An Essay on
Rethinking the Foundation of Eidentiay Priileges, 83 B.U. L. REv. 315, 315 (2003) (recognizing the
importance and significance of Wigmore's treatise to the understanding of evidence and the rules of
privilege). The modern formulation of the attorney-client privilege has remained largely the same
from the time of Wigmore. See Hazard, sefra note 9, at 1062 (acknowledging the attorney-client
privilege ought to apply to communications by an accused criminal made to counsel in contemplation
of a defense to a pending or imminent prosecution concerning some completed crime). But see
Imwinkelried, supra, at 317-20 (critiquing the premise upon which Wigmore states the attorney-client
is founded and proposing courts move away from the Wigmore's still-highly-regarded, instrumental
theory).
14. See Davis, supra note 9, at 173 (commenting on the implicit limitations in the rules of
attorney-client privilege and noting "the client's knowledge of underlying facts is not protected"
from disclosure, thus, creating "a distinction between the contents of a lawyer-client communication
and the contents of a client's memory").
15. See EVID. 503 (stating the client has a privilege to prevent disclosure of communications
made to facilitate legal services to the client); Snyder, supra note 13, at 482-83 (explaining the
formulation of the attorney-client privilege and its implicit limitations).
16. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (holding attorney-client privilege is
essential to our system of justice and while it protects the confidences of wrongdoers, it may not be
abused to protect communications made in anticipation of future wrongdoings); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) (emphasizing a client's communications are to be confidential
so the attorney may properly assist the client to comply with the law); Davis, supra note 9, at 175
(recognizing the crime-fraud exception is inclusive of the entire communication, even portions that
were not related to the anticipated crime or fraud, rendering the whole communication discoverable).
Since Upjohn was decided, there has been an unprecedented expansion of the crime-fraud exception
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in some circumstances.'7  Inadvertent disclosure of privileged
communication does not constitute an effective waiver of the attorney-
client privilege because the waiver must be made intentionally.'8
Naturally, it follows that, if a defendant is unknowingly recorded while
speaking to his or her attorney for the purpose of receiving legal advice,
the disclosures made by the client are inadvertent. Importantly, the
attorney-client privilege is an exclusionary rule of evidence, and privileged
information that does not fall under an applicable exception should not be
used against the accused at trial."
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
During the Elizabethan period, the attorney-client privilege was based
on the notion that an attorney was a "gentleman" and could not betray the
oath made to the client.2 0 By the eighteenth century, the justification for
the privilege became more utilitarian and has survived over time.2 1  In
1829, the Supreme Court of Vermont noted, in Dixon v. Parmelee," the
privilege allowed the attorney to better conduct his cause. Modern
to the attorney-client privilege, and it has become the primary measure of the limits of the privilege.
See Norman W. Spaulding, Compiance, Cmaive Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the Attorney-
Clent Priilege, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 135, 138-39 (outlining the expansion of the crime-fraud exception
throughout the end of the twentieth century).
17. See FED. R. EVID. 502 (outlining the circumstances under which the attorney-client
privilege may be waived).
18. See id. (providing inadvertent disclosure of privileged information does constitute a waiver
of the attorney-client privilege if "the holder of the privilege... took reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure] and... rectify the error"); EVID. 503 (stating a person upon whom the Texas Rules of
Evidence confer a privilege waives the privilege if the person voluntarily discloses or consents to
disclosure of the privileged information).
19. See Strong v. State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (recognizing the
importance of the attorney-client privilege as an exclusionary rule of evidence, though the privilege is
not a principle derived from the Constitution). As one commentator notes, the "attorney-client
privilege is the product of judicial decisions," which have been codified in statutes. Hazard, supra
note 9, at 1064.
20. See Spaulding, supra note 16, at 137 (noting, from its earliest roots in the English common
law, "the privilege recognized a point of gentlemanly honor" and the unseemliness of forcing a
lawyer to betray a client's confidence); see also Hazard, supra note 9, at 1069 (stating the privilege
between attorney and client is clearly grounded from the late 1700s).
21. See The Attorny-Ch6ent Priilege: Fixed Riles, Balancing, and Constitudonal Enitlement, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 464, 467 (1977) [hereinafter Attorngy-Chent Priilege: Fixed Rles] (explaining the modern law
on privilege is still consistent with the utilitarian theory).
22. Dixon v. Parmelee, 2 Vt. 185 (1829).
23. See id. at 188 ("It is the privilege of the client, that the mouth of his counsel should be
forever sealed against the disclosure of things necessarily communicated to him for the better
conducting his cause."); see also Confidenial Communications Between Client and Attomy, 5 ALB. L.J.,
Jan. 6, 1872, at 1, 2 ("The more nearly he succeeds in possessing himself of the secrets of his client's
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policy focuses on the needs of the justice system to produce just results.24
The modern justification is utilitarian because for the attorney to advocate
effectively, there must be confidence and trust between the attorney and
the client.25 There are three assumptions regarding the attorney-client
privilege:
First, it assumes that a client will communicate with counsel more fully and
truthfully if attorney-client communications are protected from disclosure.
Second, it assumes that an attorney can advise her client more effectively if
the client is more forthcoming. Finally, it assumes that the value of the
resulting improved legal representation exceeds the cost of undisclosed
evidence. 26
Thus, there is an implied tradeoff between effective representation and
disclosure of all the pertinent facts of a case.2
It is critical the client can trust the attorney and be sure the attorney is
mind, motives, and thoughts, the better he can do justice not only to the client himself, but to the
court and the community . . . .").
24. See Davis, supra. note 9, at 170 (finding, while the justifications behind the attorney-client
privilege are many, the general consensus seems to be that the privacy and professionalism required
by the attorney-client privilege are "vital to our system of justice"); see also Steven Bradford, Confct of
Laws and the Attorney-Cent Priilege. A Territorial Solution, 52 U. Prr. L. REV. 909, 914 (1991)
(discussing the replacement of the English justification for the attorney-client privilege with the
modem utilitarian argument that supports it today).
25. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The privilege recognizes that
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir.
1978) (explaining for our adversary system to function properly, any advice a client receives from her
lawyer should be insulated from discovery by the government); Ovalle v. State, No. 13-12-00272-CR,
2014 WL 69545, at *6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 9, 2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op.) (contending
interference by a state agent into the attorney-client relationship chills and diminishes the discussion
between attorney and client); Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 724 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010,
pet. refd) (holding free two-way communication between attorney and client is necessary if counsel
is to be effective and is linked to the accuracy and integrity of fact finding); see also Ruzenski, supra
note 9, at 471-72 (commenting the attorney-client privilege "is a necessary building block in
ensuring that justice is served" because lawyers can only render proper and effective legal assistance
when they are made aware of all of the facts).
26. See Bradford, supra note 24, at 914 (outlining the assumptions that are said to justify and
explain the modem rationale behind the attorney-client privilege).
27. See id. at 914 ("The privilege limits the available relevant evidence, seriously impeding the
search for truth, but it does so in pursuit of what is perceived to be a higher value." (footnote
omitted)); Davis, supra note 9, at 173 (acknowledging the scope of the privilege creates a conflict with
the concepts of promoting disclosure and searching for truth in judicial proceedings); Ruzenski, supra
note 9, at 473 (stating that the attorney-client privilege "is interpreted narrowly because it inhibits the
truth seeking process"); see also Attorney--Cent Pridlege: Fixed Rules, supra note 21, at 478-79 (stating
only in extreme situations when the values undercutting the privilege clearly outweigh the
justification for it, should courts rely on the exceptions to the attorney-client privilege).
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the client's agent and not an agent of the state or of the law.2 ' The
attorney-client relationship must consist of genuine fidelity so greater
candor may flow from it. 29  If the attorney-client relationship is intruded
upon by law enforcement or prosecutors without just cause, the
confidence in the privilege and the candor between an attorney and his or
her client will be severely diminished.
V. THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Distinct from the evidentiary attorney-client privilege is the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality."o Some scholars believe the two concepts should
be harmonized, thus, strengthening the privilege.3" The ethical duty is
distinct from the evidentiary privilege, as it is a duty developed by lawyers
and the American Bar Association (ABA) and imposes upon an attorney
an obligation to maintain confidentiality in all matters of representation.32
28. See Spaulding, supra note'16, at 162 (forwarding the primary incentive of the attorney-client
privilege is the need for the client to be able to trust the attorney and be assured the attorney is not
an agent of the state, the law, the court, or the client's adversaries).
29. See id. (conditioning a successful attorney-client relationship on the existence of genuine
fidelity between lawyer and client).
30. The attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of confidentiality are two similar but
distinct concepts. While both are communications privileges, one is an evidentiary privilege and the
other extends beyond termination of the representation. See Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonigng Priilege
and Confdentiaity, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 72-75 (1999) (noting the importance of differentiating
between the evidentiary nature of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of a lawyer to
safeguard client confidences). The Supreme Court recognizes a duty of loyalty as one of the essential
components of reasonable performance by defense counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688 (1984) (proclaiming defense counsel owes to the client a duty of loyalty because it is
counsel's function to assist the client); see also Edward J. Imwinkelied, The Dangerous Trnd Bluning the
Distinction Between a Reasonable Expectation of Confdentiaty in Priilege Law and a Reasonable Expectation of
Privay in Fourib Amendment Jurimrdence, 57 LOY. L. REV. 1, 26 (2011) (asserting "[i]f the courts were
to lose sight of [the] distinction" between the ethical confidentiality privilege and the attorney-client
privilege, "the consequences could be a significant expansion of the obstructive impact of privileges
on the search for truth in litigation"); Mosteller, supra note 5, at 991-92 (discussing the duty of loyalty
recognized in Strickland and concluding, within that duty, the duty of confidentiality promulgated by
the ABA is widely recognized).
31. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 89 (stating legislatures could refine the privilege rules so they
subsume the appropriate limits of secrecy instead of maintaining two separate rules with different
definitions that are enforced by separate bodies). But see Jean Fleming Powers, Going Too Far to
Achieve Harmony, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 203, 203 (1999) (admitting the attorney-client privilege and the
attorney's duty of confidentiality are often confused in application but noting, just because there is
confusion between these two rules, consolidation of the two concepts is not necessarily the most
appropriate remedy).
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) (providing "a lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client" subject to exceptions
enumerated in the rule); see also Zacharias, supra note 30, at 72-73 (stating confidentiality became a
duty promulgated by lawyer associations based on how client-lawyer relationships should function to
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The duty of confidentiality was recently codified in the ABA Model
Rules,3 3 and the Supreme Court noted in Stockton v. Ford,14 "There are few
of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence
than that of attorney and client."" The Court further held it was the duty
of the courts to protect important relationships, such as that of attorney
and client, by seeing such relationships are not used to prejudice those
bestowing them.3 6
In Texas, a codified duty of confidentiality appears in Rule 503 of the
Texas Rules of Evidence under a special provision for criminal cases.37
The relevant provision states: "In criminal cases, a client has a privilege to
prevent the lawyer ... from disclosing any other fact which came to the
knowledge of the lawyer ... by reason of the attorney-client
relationship."38 Correspondingly, a defense attorney has a duty to
safeguard confidential client information and affirmatively act to protect
such information when made aware of a possible intrusion by the state.3 9
The Austin Lawyers Guild has filed its suit in compliance with, and
pursuant to, the duty of a criminal defense attorney to maintain client
confidence and loyalty.
best serve the legal system). But see Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiaity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 337,
344 (2014) ("On a more general level, lawyer confidentiality interferes with transparency in our
society, including transparency in government officials, financial institutions, and other power
structures that affect our daily lives."). A minority of legal scholars argue against the confidentiality
rules and note the radical contrarian position of arguing for their abolishment and the unlikely
acceptance of such a position. See Stevenson, supra, at 347 (commenting on the unpopularity of
taking a stance against lawyer-client confidentiality rules).
33. The duty of confidentiality became more a product of legislation as legal ethics became
codified as a result of the ABA's promulgating the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
1983. See Zacharias, supra note 30, at 72 (explaining the legislative nature of legal ethics and the duty
of confidentiality follows from the ABA and other lawyer organizations attempt to develop rules
based on a unique vision of what lawyers should be in the community).
34. Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232 (1850).
35. Id. at 247.
36. See id. (placing on the courts a duty to protect the attorney-client relationship). To invoke
the protection of confidentiality privilege, all that one must prove is that one "had the required
expectation of confidentiality at the very time of the communication." Imwinkelried, supra note 30,
at 13. Thus, to determine whether or not a confidentiality privilege has attached, "the critical time is
the time of the communication itself." Id. at 15.
37. See TEX. R. EviD. 503(b)(2) (providing a special rule of privilege in criminal cases).
38. Id.
39. See Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 02-01, at 17 (2002)
(commenting a defense attorney "has a fundamental and affirmative duty to act to protect the
confidence"). In deciding whether the duty of confidentiality has been breached, a court will
interpret the duty more broadly than it would the attorney-client privilege because it applies in most
contexts. Zacharias, supra note 30, at 73.
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VI. PENDING LITIGATION AGAINST THE TRAvIs COUNTY
SHERRIFF's DEPARTMENT
A. The Plaintiffs
The Texas Civil Rights Project (TCRP) was established in 1990 by
Oficina Legal del Pueblo Unido, Inc., a grassroots foundation aimed at
providing legal services to low-income people and minorities.40 The
TCRP aims to "promote racial, social, and economic justice through
litigation, education, and social services" for those who are "least able to
defend themselves.""1 Through the Prisoners' Rights Program, the
organization advances the rights of the incarcerated through litigation and
advocacy that will have broad impact.4 2
The Austin Lawyers Guild is a local organization of attorneys, legal
workers, law students, and activists whose goal is to solve local
problems.4 The organization seeks to keep those in the legal community
engaged in activism efforts." The Austin Lawyers Guild strives to unite
the community and "create organizations that will fight over the long
haul."4s
B. The Case
On April 29, 2014, a group of Travis County defense attorneys filed a
class action lawsuit alleging conversations between defense attorneys and
their inmate-clients were being recorded by the Travis County Sheriff's
Office and turned over to the prosecution.46  Securus Technologies
40. Our History, TEx. C.R. PROJECT, http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/81/our-history
(last visited May 12, 2016).
41. Our Mission, TEx. C.R. PROJECT, http://rww.texascivilrightsproject.org/3170/our-mission
(last visited May 12, 2016).
42. See Prisoners' Rights, TEX. C.R. PROJECT, http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/programs-
and-services/prisoners-rights (last visited May 12, 2016) (describing the Prisoners' Rights Program
and its goal of improving conditions in Texas jails and prisons where over 200,000 people are
incarcerated on a given day).
43. About, AUSTIN LAW. GUILD, http://austinlawyersguild.org/about (last visited May 12,
2016).
44. Id.
45. Community Organijng, AUSTIN LAW. GUILD, https://sites.google.com/site/
austinlawyersguild/community-organizing (last visited May 12, 2016).
46. See Angela Morris, Class Action Alleges Layers' Calls to Inmates Still Recorded, Visitation Option
Impacts Income, TEX. LAW. (July 31, 2014), http://www.texaslawyer.com/id=1202665374235/Class-
Action-Alleges-Lawyers-Calls-to-Inmates-Still-Recorded-Visitation-Option-Impacts-
Income?sireturn=20160324153502 (reporting on the allegations of violation of the attorney-client
privilege against the Travis County Sherriff's Department); see also Martha Neil, Recorded jail Phone
Calls Violate 6th Amendment and Cost Us Money, Attorneys Say in Lawsuit, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2014,
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provides the recording services for Travis County and claims
conversations between attorneys and clients are completely privateY7 The
plaintiffs attorney, Brian McGiverin of the Texas Civil Rights Project, has
said it is "too soon to know how many calls have been recorded.""8 The
group of defense attorneys says it became aware of the situation because
some prosecutors have actually turned over recordings.49 Additionally, it
notes prosecutors have used information gleaned from the recordings to
their advantage during litigation.so McGiverin also told an NBC affiliate:
"In terms of existing convictions that may have been secured with
prosecutors' unlawful use of these recordings, that does open a big can of
worms."s' The plaintiffs also state, "Criminal defense lawyers in early
2013 contacted policymakers with evidence, . . . but the defendants 'did
nothing to fix it.'" 2 Leading criminal defense attorneys had proposed
that judges sign protective orders to prevent the alleged conduct from
happening in the future, but judges wanted the prosecuting attorneys "to
be on board with the solution." 3 Becoming frustrated with the lack of
progress, the plaintiffs felt they had no choice but to proceed with a
11:25 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/recorded jai phonecalls violate 6th
amendmentandcostusmoney-attorneys ("Joining colleagues in Florida, Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania and Tennessee who have complained that jailed defendants' phone calls with their
attorneys are being recorded, some Texas lawyers have filed an amended class action complaint
objecting to the practice.").
47. See Lanyers Want Court to Stop Texas Jailfrom Recording Calls with Inmates, THOMSON REUTERS,
http://blog.thomsonreuters.com/index.php/lawyers-want-court-to-stop-texas-jail-from-recording-
talks-with-inmates (last visited May 12, 2016) (reporting on the claims alleged against Securus
Technologies and the company's assertions that conversations between legal counsel and inmates are
completely private).
48. See Lawsuit Filed over Recorded Calls at Travis Couny jail, MY FOX AUSTIN (on file with the St.
May's Law Journal) (saying it is too soon to tell how many calls were recorded and the plaintiffs seek
injunctive relief to prevent the practice from reoccurring).
49. See Morris, supra note 46 (stating prosecutors have handed over confidential recordings and
defense lawyers have proof of the alleged misconduct).
50. See Jeremy Heallen, Texas Prosecutors Accused of Spying on Defense Attys, LAW 360,
http://www.law360.com/articles/533371 /texas-prosecutors-accused-of-spying-on-defense-attys (last
visited May 12, 2016) (outlining allegations of prosecution gaining an unfair, tactical advantage by
listening to recordings of privileged information); see also Neil, supra note 46 (discussing the plaintiffs
amended complaint).
51. David Lee, Calls Recorded for Prosecutions, Lauyers Say, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Apr. 30,
2014,4:54 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2014/04/30/67462.htm.
52. Morris, supra note 46 (reporting on plaintiffs' requests to prosecutors and state officials to
desist from listening to attorney-client phone calls).
53. Id. Some scholars believe going to the trial judge is an effective means of curbing
prosecutorial misconduct because the trial judge often does not publicly identify the offending
prosecutor and because state judges stand for election. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute
ProsecutonalImmunity, 2005 BYU L. REv. 53, 66.
lawsuit.54 The goal of the litigation is to protect the right to speak
privately with an attorney, which is -arguably one of the most cherished
rights in the legal system.5 5 Lawyers for the plaintiffs have stated that the
scope of the lawsuit is not yet clear, as it encompasses some very
important issues.s5
VII. IMPLICATIONS ON ArORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. The Federal Wiretap Act
Congress's intent regarding the Federal Wiretap Act was to balance the
legitimate needs of law enforcement in conducting investigations with the
privacy interests of the citizens." Federal and state courts issue hundreds
of electronic surveillance orders each year, and intrusion into privileged
communications is a problem in each case because while 18 U.S.C. § 2510
does not allow intercepted privileged information to be admitted into
evidence, it does not prohibit the interception of such privileged
communication.5 s It is firmly established that the Federal Wiretap Act
applies in a prison or detention center and inmates are entitled to notice if
their calls are being recorded.5" Accordingly, information obtained
deceptively and without notice should not be admitted into evidence"o or
54. See Morris, supra note 46 ("It's gone on long enough. We decided it was absolutely
necessary to pursue this litigation.").
55. See Angie Beavin, Lawsuit Accuses Trasis County Jail of Recording Calls with Attoneys, KXAN
(Apr. 29, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://kxan.com/2014/04/29/lawsuit-accuses-travis-county-jail-of-
recording-calls-with-attorneys (speaking to Austin news station KXAN, McGiverin advocated the
importance of the attorney-client privilege and the need for private communication between attorney
and client).
56. Id.
57. See Michael Goldsmith & Kathryn Ogden Balmforth, The Electronic Surveillance of Privileged
Communications: A Conflict in Doctrines, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 904 (1991) ("In shaping Title III,
Congress sought to balance two vital competing interests: the legitimate needs of law enforcement
and the privacy concerns of the citizenry.").
58. See id at 909 (noting 18 U.S.C. § 2510 does not allow law enforcement to use privileged
information that has been intercepted as evidence in a criminal case, however, the mere fact that
pertinent privileged information is being intercepted presents serious privacy issues).
59. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2012); see Adams v.
City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 984-85 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding even prisoners are entitled to
some notice that their calls are being monitored by the facility or another agency); United States v.
Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower court's finding that monitoring
detainee's phone call did not amount to a constitutional violation because the detainee consented to
having calls monitored); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510 clearly applies to prison monitoring).
60. See generaly Davis, supra note 9, at 182 (analyzing a Bureau of Prisons Regulation that allows
the attorney general to obtain wiretapped information upon proper notice and probable cause and
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used improperly to gain any unfair advantage.
B. The Texas Wiretap Act
The Texas Wiretap Act provides that a party to a communication may
sue a person who intercepts or attempts to intercept the communication,
employs another to do the same; or who uses or divulges information that
the person knows or should know was obtained by interception of the
communication."* The statute further imposes liability on common
carriers, landlords, and building operators who aid or permit the
interception of a communication.62 The section creating a cause of action
does not apply to communications intercepted pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2516." The alleged actions of the Travis County Sheriffs Office and
Securus Technologies were not in compliance with federal or state wiretap
laws, as detainees were led to believe that their conversations with defense
counsel were private and no notice was given that conversations were
recorded.
C. The Fourth Amendment
In their complaint, the Austin Lawyers Guild alleged that the defendants
violated the Fourth Amendment." The Fourth Amendment provides
concluding courts would exclude evidence when prison officials deceptively induced a prisoner to
believe that conversations were not being monitored); Ruzenski, supra note 9, at 479 (evaluating a
Bureau of Prisons Regulation that allows wiretapping of attorney-client telephone calls if there is
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is using the attorney to facilitate terrorism and noting that
written notice must be given to the detainee and the attorney before any monitoring is to occur).
61. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 123.002(a) (West 2006) (providing a cause of
action for violation of the Texas Wiretap Act). A "wire communication" is "an aural transfer made
in whole or in part through the use of facilities for transmission of communication through wire,
cable, or other connection between the point of origin and the point of reception." TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 18.20, § 1 (West 2006). To "intercept" a wire communication is to acquire
the contents of a wire communication through the use of a device. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. S 123.001
(defining "communication" and "interception" for purposes of establishing the cause of action).
62. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 123.002(a) (3).
63. Id. § 123.002(b); see 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (providing that communications may be
intercepted after proper application to a federal judge). Despite regulations on wiretapping,
enforcement agencies often do not exercise their power with restraint and side step or ignore
regulations. See DAVID FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT's RIGHTS TODAY 291 (1976) (noting the
ineffectiveness of wiretap regulations and recognizing that while wiretaps may help catch criminals,
so would listening in on confessions given to priests, rifling through mail, and searching private
homes without restriction-all illegal practices).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that the people are to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures); see also Heallen, supra note 50 ("In addition to violating wiretap laws, the ALG
says that the constitutional rights of criminal defendants are being impaired by the sharing of
intercepted attorney-client communications.").
privacy interests more broadly than the Sixth Amendment, and some have
argued it should apply to attorney-client communications.6 s This is true
because an inmate who is incarcerated has surely been seized for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, and eavesdropping on communications has
long been recognized as a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes.6 6
The Supreme Court said, "It is obvious that a jail shares none of the
attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel
room."6 7  However, the Court has noted that even in a jail, the
relationships that the law has protected and afforded particularized
confidentiality must continue to receive unceasing protection.6 " In his
concurring opinion in Kat- v. United States,"9 Justice Harlan outlined the
test for applicability of the Fourth Amendment as follows: "First that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'o7  The controlling questions are whether inmates have a
reasonable expectation of privacy when communicating with their
attorneys7 1 and whether society is prepared to recognize the inmate's
65. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, The New Regulation Alloning FederalAgents to
Monitor Attorney--Client Conversations: Why It Threatens Fourth Amendment Values, 34 CONN. L. REV.
1163, 1164 (2002) (advocating the Fourth Amendment should extend to protect inmates from
unlawful intrusion into the attorney-client privilege); see also Eric D. McArthur, Comment, The Search
and Sei re of Priileged Attorny-Cient Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (2005) (stating,
because of the important private interests embedded in the attorney-client privilege, it is
unreasonable for law enforcement to seize communications from inmates, as they are within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment).
66. Amar & Amar, supra note 65, at 1164. Wiretapping is in fact, more intrusive than the
authorized search for tangible items because the subject of the wiretap is usually unaware of any
intrusion. See FELLMAN, supra note 63, at 291 (noting wiretaps are more intrusive upon a defendant's
rights than are searches for tangible items because of the subject's usual unawareness of the
intrusion).
67. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
68. Id. at 144. But see id. (recognizing the petitioner did not claim violation of special
relationship, such as that of the attorney and client, and thus the case did not involve information
that was considered privileged).
69. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kate,
Fourth Amendment analysis was based on property law principles. See Imwinkelried, supra note 30,
at 3 (commenting on Fourth Amendment analysis prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kat).
70. Kat,- 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring). While the majority opinion held that "the
Fourth Amendment protects people and not places," Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has proved
to be the more influential pronouncement. See Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 3-4 (proclaiming the
test set out in justice Harlan's concurring opinion has been the more influential and quoted
pronouncement).
71. Davis, supra note 9, at 182 (recognizing "not all conversations within the confines of a
prison are without a reasonable expectation of privacy" such as when prison officials induce
defendants to believe that certain communications are confidential). For purposes of Fourth
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expectation as reasonable." Given the importance of the attorney-client
relationship to society, especially in the criminal justice system, it is
certainly reasonable for a criminal defendant to expect his conversations
with his attorney will remain private. A detainee's telephone
communications should be especially protected when calls are made to a
lawyer, a bail bondsman, or to any other person who will aid the inmate in
preparing for trial."
D. The Frfth Amendment
"No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."" It is well established that inmates have a right of
access to the courts, which is derived from the due process guarantees
provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Prisons shall
provide access to the courts by establishing an adequate law library or by
allowing adequate assistance from those trained in the law.' 6
Bell v. Wolfsh 7 contemplates that under the Due Process Clause, a
detainee could not be punished before having been adjudicated as guilty.7"
To constitute punishment, a governmental action must (1) cause the
detainee to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the
Amendment analysis, the defendant must have had a subjective belief that the communication was
made in private. See Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 16 (opining the requisite state of mind for Fourth
Amendment analysis as being a simple, subjective, belief that the potentially protected evidence was
free from public gaze).
72. Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 21 (asserting even when the claimant possessed the requisite
subjective belief that the communication was private, a judge must decide whether the privacy is
accepted from a broad, societal perspective); Teri Dobbins, Protecting the Unpopular from the
Unreasonable: Warrantless Monitoring of Attorney Chent Communications in Federal Prisons, 53 CATH. U. L.
REv. 295, 337 (2004) ("Because inmates have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
communications with their attorneys, and because society is prepared to recognize that expectation as
reasonable, the Fourth Amendment protects the communications from unreasonable searches and
seizures.').
73. See Inmates of Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Wecht, 565 F. Supp. 1278, 1284 (W.D. Pa. 1983) ("As
stated in our first opinion, an inmate's right to phone calls is to be protected, especially if the call is to
a lawyer, bail bondsman or other party who will aid the inmate for preparing for his trial.").
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993).
76. Georgetown Law Journal Association, Substantie Rights Retained by Prisoners, 32 ANN. REV.
CRIM. PRO. 887, 887 & n.2744 (2003).
77. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
78. See id. at 535 (holding it was inconsistent with due process to punish pretrial detainees in
the same manner as those who have already been found guilty); see also Davidson, supra note 4, at 11




governmental action must be to punish the detainee.9  Recording a
pretrial detainee's telephone communications with his attorney and
allowing the recordings to enter the hands of the prosecution would surely
cause a harm or disability because it deprives the detainee of a fair trial.
The potential use of privileged information would constitute a
punishment, as the defendant would have never received a fighting chance.
Such actions clearly violate a detainee's due process guarantees.
E. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to counsel."o Implicit in the right to counsel is the right to receive
efective"' assistance of counsel." Discussing its decision in Gideon v.
Wainnwrght," the Supreme Court reiterated that defendants have the right
to the guiding hand of counsel throughout every step in the proceedings."
79. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to be represented by an attorney is one of the most
important constitutional rights to a criminal defendant for the obvious reason that most laymen
know little about the law and legal procedure. Without the assistance of counsel, most criminal
defendants are unlikely to have an adequate defense. FELLMAN, supra note 63, at 208; see Davis, supra
note 9, at 183 (contending one important rationale behind the right to counsel is ensuring the
defendant receives a fair trial). Legal scholars also find authority to support the position that the
premise behind the attorney-client privilege is grounded in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Ruzenski, supra note 9, at 471.
81. To prove that counsel's performance was ineffective, a showing must be made that (1)
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced the client in some way. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984) (holding counsel's errors were so serious that the defendant did not receive a fair trial
as prescribed by the Sixth Amendment); Davis, supra note 9, at 183 (discussing the two-prong test
announced in Strickland).
82. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (stating if the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left at the mercy of incompetent counsel and
"judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
defendants in criminal cases'); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cit. 1978) (noting if the
professional assistance provided by the Sixth Amendment is to be meaningful, there must be free
two-way communication between attorney and client). To provide the best and most effective legal
advice, clients must feel they can make full disclosures to their defense attorneys. See Ruzenski, supra
note 9, at 472 (citing Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
83. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Prior to this case, the right to counsel applied
only in capital cases. Gideon's request for appointed counsel was denied and he defended himself
against a breaking and entering charge, which resulted in a conviction of five years. See id. at 337
("Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a
layman.'); FELLMAN, supra note 63, at 215 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon and its
recognition of the right to counsel as a fundamental right in our adversary system, especially for
those too poor to hire a lawyer).
84. See Polk Cry. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981) (emphasizing state criminal defendants
have the right to be assisted by counsel at every step during the proceedings that have been instituted
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The Court further noted that implicit in the defense attorney's duty to
advocate effectively was the assumption that counsel would be free from
state control.ss Surely, an inmate cannot receive adequate assistance of
counsel when counsel cannot do his job effectively because of state
interference. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) strongly asserts wiretapping and listening to attorney and client
telephone communications amounts to state control.8 6
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the prosecution and the police
have an affirmative duty not to circumvent or dilute the accused's right to
counsel." In Weatherford v. Bursey the Supreme Court used the following
analysis to determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment had
occurred: (1) whether the monitor's identity had been revealed; (2) the
purpose of the monitoring; (3) whether the information was revealed to
against them); FELLMAN, supra note 63, at 219 (recognizing general agreement that effective
representation means that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of a lawyer at every step in the
proceedings).
85. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 322 (acknowledging for defense counsel to effectively guide and
advise defendants, they must be free from state interference).
86. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 02-01, at 16-17
(2002) (emphasizing wiretapping and eavesdropping on attorney and client communications amounts
to state control).
87. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985) (writing for the majority, Justice Brenan
clarifies that the state and the prosecution have an affirmative duty not to act in a manner that
functions to circumvent or dilute a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel). The right to
counsel can hardly be effective if government agents or the prosecution intrude upon the relationship
between attorney and client through eavesdropping or wiretapping. See JOHN JAY DOUGLASS,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 171 (1988) (reiterating intrusive acts dilute the attorney-client
relationship and the effective representation of counsel); Davis, supra note 9, at 173 ("Many courts
have stated that this mandate is so important, that it requires strict application of the rule resulting in
little or no intrusion into the attorney-client relationship."); Mosteller, supra note 5, at 994 (stating
purposeful government intrusion into the confidential attorney-client relationship or acquisition of
information resulting from the confidential relationship is essential to finding a violation recognized
as constitutionally protected).
88. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). In Wleatherford, the Supreme Court found no
constitutional violation where an informant acting as a codefendant met with the defendant and
counsel and discussed the case. Id. at 556-57. A significant factor in the decision was the fact that
the informant did not share any information regarding the meeting or the defendant's trial strategy
with police or the prosecution. Mosteller, supra note 5, at 994-95; see Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150,
1156--57 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating there was a Sixth Amendment violation when the prosecution seized
from the defendant's jail cell a document prepared by the defendant at the request of his lawyer
detailing the defendant's involvement in the charged offense and used the document against the
defendant on cross examination); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978) (dismissing
the original indictment because the Sixth Amendment was violated when the prosecution obtained
information from an informant, who was a co-defendant and concurrent client of defense counsel,
regarding the joint-trial strategy).
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prosecutors;89 and (4) whether the defendant could show actual prejudice
in the preparation of or during the actual trial.9 o
Another consideration when conversations with counsel are overheard
is when the eavesdropping has produced, directly or indirectly, any
evidence offered at trial." Detainees whose telephone calls have been
illegally recorded could meet this standard, as prosecutors are allegedly
receiving the illegally obtained information and using it indirectly to secure
a conviction.
If detainees become aware of the monitoring of attorney-client
telephone calls, the consequences would produce a chilling effect on the
attorney-client privilege and on the right to effective assistance of counsel.
In essence, the monitoring would amount to a restriction, which would
impede access to an inmate's attorney.92
89. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that when the intrusion is intentional and the confidential
information has been secured by the prosecution without justification, prejudice is presumed.
Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 1995). The Tenth Circuit's presumption of
prejudice goes somewhat further than other courts. Compare Mosteller, supra note 5, at 998-99
(discussing Haworitb and the court's focus on whether the invasion was purposeful and groundless),
with State v. Lenarz, 22 A.3d 536, 542 (Conn. 2011) (concluding prejudice may be presumed when
the prosecutor has received and read privileged attorney-client information regardless of whether the
intrusion of the attorney-client relationship was intentional).
90. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554 (holding "prejudice" in a criminal case is established by
proving that information gleaned from an intrusion into the attorney-<lient relationship was used by
the prosecution either directly or indirectly, to the substantial detriment to the defendant); Davis,
supra note 9, at 183 (outlining to prove prejudice, a defendant must show there was an improper
intrusion on the attorney-client relationship, the prosecution used information gained from the
intrusion against the defendant (directly or indirectly), to infuse information regarding the accused's
defense, and the information used was a substantial detriment to the defendant).
91. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 554. (1977) ("Had Weatherford testified at Bursey's trial as to the
conversation between Bursey and Wise; had any of the State's evidence originated in these
conversations; had those overheard conversations been used in any other way to the substantial
detriment of Bursey; or even had the prosecution learned from Weatherford, an undercover agent,
the details of the Bursey-Wise conversations about trial preparations, Bursey would have a much
stronger case.").
92. See Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cit. 1995) (holding a pretrial detainee's
assertion that his telephone privileges were revoked and impeded his access to an attorney would
amount to a Sixth Amendment violation); see also Jaramillo v. Bexar Cty., No. SA-09-CV-0656 XR
(NN), 2011 WL 1655892, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2011) (recognizing "courts have not always been
clear about the substantive rights implicated" by attorney-client communication, but there exists
authority that would indicate that limiting pretrial detainees access to an attorney by telephone would
amount to a violation of the Constitution).
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VIII. WHAT RIGHTS DO PRISON INMATES HAVE?
Prison walls do not isolate inmates from the protection of the
Constitution." The Supreme Court held, in Hudson v. Palmer," that
inmates do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are in
their cells." The Court balanced the need for prison security and
protection from illegal activity and contraband against the expectation of
privacy, stating it would be impossible to accomplish important prison
objectives if inmates were allowed the right to privacy in their cells. 6 The
sensitive nature of the information exchanged between an attorney and an
incarcerated client, however, would support a reasonable expectation of
privacy.97  In Wolf v. McDonnell," the Supreme Court upheld a Nebraska
prison regulation that allowed prison officials to open, but not read, mail
from attorneys in a prisoner's presence to inspect for contraband because
such a regulation would not impose upon an inmate's constitutional
rights.9 9 Thus, criminal defendants have the right to communicate privately
with their attorney; though, the right is not absolute.100
93. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (noting prisoners retain certain fundamental
guarantees while incarcerated and when a prison regulation offends a fundamental guarantee, federal
courts shall discharge their duties to protect fundamental rights); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 523 (1984) ("We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution.
No 'iron curtain' separates one from the other.").
94. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
95. See id. at 525-26 (notwithstanding caution in approaching claims regarding the Fourth
Amendment's applicability, the Supreme Court holds society is not prepared to recognize an inmate's
right to privacy while in his or her prison cell); Pollard v. State, 392 S.W.3d 785, 796 (Tex.- App.
Waco 2012, no pet) (holding a defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in DNA left on a
cup and spoon the defendant was using while in a detoxifying cell in a prison); see also Dobbins, supra
note 72, at 331 (stating it is clear inmates are not afforded all of their rights to privacy under the
Fourth Amendment while they are incarcerated).
96. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527 ("The two interests here are the interest of society in the
security of its penal institutions and the interest of the prisoner in privacy within his cell. The latter
interest, of course, is already limited by the exigencies of the circumstances: A prison shares none of
the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room."); Pollard, 392 S.W.3d
at 797 (finding DNA collection from prisoners reasonable in light of their diminished privacy rights,
the minimal intrusion involved, and the legitimate government interest in the use of DNA to assist in
solving crime).
97. See Dobbins, supra note 72, at 338 (advocating the sensitive nature of the communication
between attorney and client makes recognition of the right to privacy in speaking with an attorney
reasonable even though the client is incarcerated).
98. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
99. See id. at 577 (concluding the act of opening mail designated as attorney-client
communication in the presence of an inmate does not have a chilling effect on the privilege because
prison officials cannot read the communication).
100. See Woodruff v. State, 330 S.W.3d 709, 724 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. refd)




Pretrial detainees are individuals who have been arrested, not yet
been adjudicated, and remain incarcerated because they do not qualify for
pretrial release."' Even though they have not been convicted of any
crime, pretrial detainees have limited constitutional rights, and it is clear
that they possess, at least, those rights that convicted prisoners enjoy.' 02
IX. How THE COURT SHOULD RULE IN.AUSITNLAWYERS GUILD v.
SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
The issue of jailhouse monitoring of inmates' telephone calls has long
plagued criminal defense attorneys and has been discussed by the
NACDL.' 0o Specifically, the NACDL has concluded that a criminal
defense attorney has an ethical duty to take affirmative action to protect
privileged information from being intercepted by the government.' 0 4
In a recent case, Nordstrom v. Ryan,' the Ninth Circuit dealt with
similar issues. An inmate challenged an Arizona Department of
Corrections policy that allowed prison officials to scan, and even read, legal
mail to ensure it was not contraband and was legal subject matter.'0 6 The
Ninth Circuit concluded Nordstrom's allegations amounted to a Sixth
Amendment claim, and if he been challenging his conviction based on "an
intrusion into the attorney[-]cient relationship," then a reversal of the
conviction would have been required.'07 However, Nordstrom presented
a constitutional rights claim-as does the Austin Lawyers Guild-in which
he sought injunctive relief and was able to demonstrate he was realistically
generally has the right to consult with an attorney privately).
101. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979) (examining the rights of pretrial detainees).
102. See id. at 545-46 (stating pretrial inmates have at least the same constitutional guarantees
that convicted inmates possess); see also Ian Wood, Note, An Unreasonable Onkne Search: How a Sheriffs
Webcams Strengthened Fourth Amendment Privag Rsghts of Pretrial Detainees, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
1, 4 (2005) (describing the limited rights of pretrial detainees).
103. See Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 02-01, at 17
(2002) (discussing the duties owed to a client by a defense attorney after learning privileged telephone
communications between the lawyer and the client have been monitored).
104. See id. (asserting a criminal defense attorney's duty to protect attorney-client
communications form being discovered by the government is "an ethical and constitutional duty").
105. Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cit. 2014).
106. See id. at 907 (detailing how Nordstrom advised a guard he had outgoing legal mail and the
prison guard proceeded to read the entire contents of the letter against his objections).
107. See id. at 911 ("The harm Nordstrom alleges is not that tainted evidence was used against
him but that his right to privately confer with counsel has been chilled. This is a plausible
consequence of the intentional reading of his confidential legal mail.").
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threatened by further repeated violations.' This case is analogous to the
Austin Lavyers Guild case and should guide the court's ruling concerning
the importance of upholding and protecting the attorney-client
relationship.
X. WHAT REMEDIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE?
In Turner v. Safly,'0 the Supreme Court concluded, "[W]hen a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid
if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."1 1 0 Improper
intrusions into the attorney-client relationship are not permissible
regulations.1 1 1
Interference with a prisoner's right of access to the courts may
constitute grounds for relief under the Federal Civil Rights Acts as well as
through writs of habeas corpus."' Obtaining relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 is extremely difficult as prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity when
acting in their capacity as an advocate."' A writ of habeas corpus, which
is an original proceeding in federal court and a form of collateral attack on
a state judgment, is also very difficult to obtain." 4  However, the plaintiffs
108. See id. (requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a realistic threat of repeated injury exists by
showing either (1) "the defendant had .. a written policy, and that the injury 'stems from' that
policy" or (2) "the harm is part of 'pattern of officially sanctioned ... behavior, violative of the
plaintiffs[] [federal] rights' (2nd & 4th alteration in original) (quoting LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d
1318, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985))).
109. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
110. Id. at 89.
111. See Nordstrom, 762 F.3d at 910 (concluding a policy that allows officials to scan and read
attorney-client communications is "highly likely" to infringe on an inmate's rights).
112. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) ("First, the demarcation line between
civil rights actions and habeas petitions is not always clear. The Court has already recognized
instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed under either form of relief.").
113. Under the principal federal civil rights statute, prosecutors enjoy either absolute immunity
or qualified immunity. See 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (2012) (creating civil liability for the deprivation of
rights). When a prosecutor acts as advocate absolute immunity applies, even if the prosecutor has
acted in bad faith. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976). Qualified immunity applies only
when a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or an administrator. See id. at 420 (holding absolute
immunity of a public official under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 defeats a suit at the outset so long as
the prosecutor was acting within the scope of prosecutorial duties); Karen McDonald Henning, The
Failed Legacy ofAbsolute Immunity Under Imbler: Prmiding a Compmmise Approach to Claims ofProsecutoial
Misconduct, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230 (2013) (outlining the functional test developed by the
Supreme Court in Imbler, which determined whether prosecutorial immunity was absolute or qualified
based on the nature of the conduct and the function the prosecutor was performing); Johns, supra
note 53, at 53-54 (explaining the circumstances under which absolute and qualified immunity apply
in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions).
114. See Johns, supra note 53, at 69 (opining writ of habeas corpus is an ineffective manner for
obtaining relief from a conviction that was the result of prosecutorial misconduct mostly attributed
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in Austin Lanyers Guild seek only declaratory and injunctive relief and
simply ask the court to stop the Travis County Sheriffs Office and
Securus Technologies from engaging in improper investigative conduct.
XII. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
While affording relief to those who have allegedly been wronged by the
actions of the defendants is the issue of utmost importance, one must also
consider what the ethical implications and repercussions are for
prosecutors who have used the illegally obtained information."s Texas is
one of forty-nine states that have fundamentally adopted the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct."' The respective comments to Rule 3.09
of the Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct and Rule 3.8 of
the ABA Model Rules outline the special duties of prosecutors"17 and
recognize a duty to ensure justice is done and not simply a duty to be an
advocate."' Additionally, the commentary to the Texas rule cautions that
to the harmless error rule).
115. See Mosteller, supra note 5, at 962 (commenting on the derivative or indirect use of the
"fruits' of the violation" of an evidentiary privilege and recognizing the Constitution, under certain
circumstances, prohibits the derivative use of confidential communications). To put it broadly,
"prosecutorial misconduct occurs whenever a conviction is pursued 'outside the bounds of
acceptable advocacy' and includes calculated transgressions as well as ignorance of applicable legal
standards and court rules. See Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons.- The Role of Law Schools in Addressing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 400 (2011) (outlining the general definition of
prosecutorial misconduct (quoting Henning, supra note 4, at 720)).
116. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA CENTER FOR PROF. RESP.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model rules of_
professional-conduct/alphaliststate-adopting.model rules.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) (listing
the states that have adopted the Model Rules and their initial dates of adoption).
117. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the ethical rules that govern the legal
profession. These rules single out prosecutors as the only lawyers who have a special duty beyond
zealous representation of their clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR
AsS'N 2013). Disciplinary codes have always recognized that prosecutors should be treated
differently from other lawyers. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutoial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
1573, 1576 (reiterating disciplinary codes have always treated prosecutors differently from other
lawyers and discussing the promulgation of special provisions for criminal prosecutors in the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Henning, supra note 4, at 727 (describing the special
provisions and responsibilities promulgated by the ABA in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
that apply uniquely to prosecutors).
118. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09 cmt. 1, reprinted in TEX.
Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (recognizing a prosecutor has a greater duty
than that of an advocate and is entrusted with "the responsibility to see that justice is done"); see also
MODEL RULES r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (stating "a prosecutor has the added responsibility of being a minister of
justice and not simply an advocate"); Green, supra note 117, at 1588 (addressing the prosecutor's
function. as a minister of justice and noting a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to prevent the
conviction of innocent people and to serve as a gatekeeper in the court system). Professor Green
lists four reasons why prosecutors should be treated differently from other lawyers: (1) "prosecutors
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a prosecutor "should not initiate or exploit any violation of a suspect's
right to counsel."" 9  Further, it explains, a "knowing disregard of the
prosecutor's obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion
could constitute a violation of Rule 8.04" under several different
theories.12 0 Under the ABA Model Rule, prosecutors also have an
obligation to see that a defendant is afforded procedural justice.'21 ABA
Model Rule 8.4 states misconduct occurs when a lawyer "engages in
conduct involving dishonesty or engages in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice."' 22  The ABA has set forth standards that
apply specifically to prosecutors and provide, "A prosecutor should not
knowingly use illegal means to obtain evidence ... or encourage others to
use such means."'23 Despite promulgation of specific provisions by
regulating authorities, some argue that the existing rules are not
enough.12 4
face questions of professional conduct that other lawyers do not face," (2) they "are subject to
different legal obligations than other lawyers" (burdens of proof), (3) "the professional role of
prosecutors is different from that of other lawyers who represent private clients in the adversarial
context," and (4) "the traditional understandings relating to prosecutors' conduct are distinctive."
Green, supra note 117, at 1576-78.
119. See TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.09 cmt. 1 (asserting
"prosecutors should not exploit violations of a suspect's right to counsel").
120. Id.; see id. R. 8.04 (outlining examples of lawyer misconduct).
121. See MODEL RULES r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (recognizing a prosecutor has the responsibility to see that
a defendant is afforded procedural justice); Green, supra note 117, at 1591 (indicating the prosecutor
has a special responsibility to see that the accused is afforded justice and ensured the ability to
exercise their procedural rights).
122. MODEL RULES r. 8.4.
123. See Prosecuion Function, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
criminaljusticesectionarchive/crimjust standardspfuncblk.html (last visited May 12, 2016)
(providing prosecutors should not use illegal means to gather evidence and must not encourage or
employ others to do so).
124. Some legal scholars have proposed the judiciary draft a separate code of ethics that would
apply exclusively to prosecutors and recognize their unique roles as minsters of justice; judiciary
oversight of these conduct rules, as opposed to oversight by ABA, would avoid potential opposition
from prosecutors' offices. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 147 (2007) (finding ABA Model Rule 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor) is "vague and subject to interpretation" as it oits important ethical concerns and
provides little clear guidance to prosecutors); Green, supra note 117, at 1587 ("If the courts, which
generally oversee the conduct of lawyers, were to draw on their experience and on the prior literature
to develop a comprehensive list of prosecutors' special responsibilities, and were to add new ones as
necessary when new problems of prosecutorial conduct came to their attention, the list would include
many responsibilities that are not presently reflected in the specific provisions of the Model Rules.");
Henning, supra note 4, at 754 (arguing that while the Constitution grants the defendants a plethora of
rights throughout criminal proceedings, there is still a significant gap between Constitutional
protection and the ethical duties of the prosecutor).
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The Supreme Court decided Berger v. United States125 in 1935, writing an
opinion that defined the role of the prosecutor as a representative of a
sovereign rather than an ordinary party; thus, the prosecutor is a servant of
the law whose interest should not be to win a case but to see that justice is
done.'2 6 The Court held, "while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones" and asserted "[i]t is as much his duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."'2 7 The
plaintiffs have also spoken, saying prosecutors "have a basic duty to
maintain the structure of the legal system."'
It has been held that actions intended to intrude upon the attorney-
client relationship may constitute violations of the Constitution."'
Additionally, the state has a duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3504 to disclose the
existence of illegal electronic surveillance when an aggrieved party makes a
prima facie showing that such surveillance has occurred.13 0  Prosecutors
should have voluntarily, as opposed to unknowingly, turned over to
defense attorneys any illegally recorded phone calls between defense
counsel and detainees. Furthermore, the prosecution should not have
sought to benefit from any information gleaned from recorded attorney-
client conversations, as such evidence would normally be excluded due to
its illegal obtainment.'3 '
125. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
126. See id. at 88 (holding a prosecutor is a servant of the law who has a twofold duty to ensure
guilt shall not escape and to ensure innocence shall not suffer). Prosecutors enjoy discretion in
bringing charges against an accused; however, they have a responsibility to bring charges only when
the guilt of the accused is sufficiently certain. See Green, supra note 117, at 1588 (commenting on the
duty of a prosecutor to see that innocent people are not wrongfully punished and to bring charges
only when the evidence supports the guilt of the accused).
127. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88; see also United States v. Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1391 (5th Cir. 1977)
("We would be remiss if on this occasion we did not recall the heavy responsibility [of
prosecutors] ... to conduct criminal trials with an acute sense of fairness and justice.") (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cit. 1973)); Bazelon, supra note
115, at 398 (emphasizing the Supreme Court's admonition that prosecutors may strike hard blows
but not foul blows).
128. See Michael McLaughlin, Texas Sheriffs Office Recorded Inmates' Calls with Attomeys, Lawsuit
Alleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:59 PM), http://www.huf6ngtonpost.com/2014/
04/29/travis-county-sheriff-records-inmates-phone-callsn_5235157.html.
129. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding a trial court's directive that a
testifying defendant could not consult with attorney during recess denied the right to counsel).
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (2012) (stating "unlawful act" for purposes of the statute includes
"the use of any electronic or mechanical devices in violation of the Constitution, laws of the United
States, or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant thereto").
131. The exclusionary rule is not merely a rule of evidence. It is derived from the Constitution
and binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
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The Supreme Court of Texas derives inherent power over the practice
of law from the Texas Constitution.13 2  In furtherance of its powers to
supervise attorney conduct, it must prepare and adopt rules it considers
necessary to discipline, suspend, or disbar attorneys.1 3' The Supreme
Court of the United States recognizes prosecutors' common law immunity
from civil suit and generally leaves prosecutorial discipline to state bar
authorities.' 3  Prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to discover, which
presents a problem when it comes to disciplining prosecutors.'3s Further,
the threat of disciplinary action does not seem to deter or prevent
(1961) (holding "all evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures and in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in state court"); FELLMAN, supra note 63, at 291 (noting the exclusionary
rule has two principles: (1) to deter unlawful or illegal police conduct and (2) to insure integrity in the
judicial system and prevent the judiciary from being a party or allowing unlawful conduct). Evidence
that is the derivative result of a violation may be suppressed where policy or constitutional doctrines
justify suppression. Mosteller, supra note 5, at 1010. Suppression typically occurs when a privilege is
violated by a party that is immediately involved in the litigation and the privilege that has been
violated involves the attorney-client relationship. See id. (explaining the most common situation in
which privileged information is suppressed by the trial court is when the derivative evidence is the
result of an intrusion or violation of the attorney-client privilege).
132. Goldberg v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 265 S.W.3d 568, 575 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
133. See TEx. GOV'T CODE § 81.072 (West 2006) (outlining the requirements the Texas
Supreme Court must follow when establishing a system for attorney disciplinary procedures).
134. The Supreme Court upheld absolute prosecutorial immunity to protect prosecutors from
malicious litigation. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) (fearing that upholding
only qualified immunity would lead to excessive actions against prosecutors by resentful, convicted
defendants). The Court recognized defendants who were legitimately wronged by prosecutors'
unethical conduct would be left without any remedy. See id. at 427 (noting absolute immunity "does
not leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress'; see also DAVIS, supra note 124, at
128 (discussing the unavailability of civil lawsuits as remedies against prosecutors who have
committed acts of misconduct); Green, supra note 117, at 1585 (explaining civil remedies are generally
not available to those harmed by prosecutorial misconduct and noting courts have a limited ability to
punish prosecutors through methods such as dismissing indictments, suppressing evidence, or
imposing contempt sanctions); Henning, supra note 4, at 818 ("The question of remedy in
prosecutorial misconduct cases is further complicated by the almost complete unavailability of civil
redress against a prosecutor."). However, the Court felt public policy encouraging the fearless and
vigorous performance of prosecutorial duties is essential to the proper functioning of the justice
system. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-28 (concluding prosecutors have absolute civil immunity
regarding misconduct that occurs in the exercise of the prosecutorial function); see also Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Expeiment in the
Regulation of Pmsecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2009) (stating the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Imbler rested on the belief that "if the aggrieved defendants could sue prosecutors civilly, 'harassment
by unfounded litigation' might deflect prosecutors from performing their duties impartially" and with
"courage and independence" (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423-24)).
135. See DAVIS, supra note 124, at 126 (noting, because prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to
discover, much of the misconduct engaged in by prosecutors goes unchallenged); Henning, supra
note 4, at, 729-30 (recognizing the difficulty in identifying prosecutorial misconduct because the
point at which a hard blow becomes a foul one is almost impossible to identify).
328
misconduct effectively,' 3 6 and the lmbler v. Pachtman'` decision is the
subject of considerable criticism.'3 8 Additionally, the reasoning behind
lmbler ignores the pressures that prosecutors face through the course of
their duties.'3 9 Another concern is that some prosecutors may be lax with
their ethical standards because they know that most ethical violations will
result in harmless error.'40 Austin Langers Guild provides a good
opportunity to evaluate prosecutorial ethics and professional discipline of
prosecutors. It is also important to take this opportunity seriously because
the unethical behavior of prosecutors hurts numerous individuals as well
136. See DAVIS, supra note 124, at 128 (opining the Supreme Court's avoidance of prosecutorial
misconduct by passing it on to state bar authorities has proven totally ineffective); Zacharias &
Green, supra note 134, at 13 (concluding the disciplinary process does not play a significant role in
influencing prosecutorial behavior); see also Henning, supra note 4, at 829 (pointing out there is
agreement among legal scholars that "recommendations to bar associations to take disciplinary
action" against prosecutors have "proved inadequate in addressing prosecutorial misconduct"); Sonja
B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutonal Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1517 (2009)
(condemning the ineffectiveness of bar associations in disciplining prosecutors and noting that they
have been lax in policing ethics). While many prosecutors are ethical, others are not. To discover
unethical prosecutors, both prosecutors and defense attorneys must be aware of the potential abuses
and act affirmatively to control them. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 1-9
(LexisNexis, 3rd ed. 2003) (warning that to curb prosecutorial misconduct, both prosecutors and
defense counsel should be aware of and vigilant of potential abuses).
137. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
138. See DAVIS, supra note 124, at 130 (opining Imbler sends a message to prosecutors that their
practices will be protected from discovery, and when they are discovered, challengers will not easily
prevail); Henning, supra note 113, at 242 (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Imbler and the
ineffectiveness of bar associations to adequately deter prosecutorial misconduct and citing reports
showing misconduct played a role in nearly a quarter of all wrongful convictions in the 1990s and
early 2000s); Johns, supra note 53, at 60-61 (discussing a 2000 study by the Innocence Project, which
found prosecutorial misconduct played a part in 26% of wrongful conviction death row cases since
1999 and the prosecutors were not often held accountable). A 1999 study conducted by the Chicago
Tribune showed from 1963 to 1999, 381 homicide convictions had been overturned as a result of
serious prosecutorial misconduct such as the use of false evidence or the suppression of exculpatory
evidence. Johns, supra note 53, at 62.
139. The Supreme Court's decision in Imbler fails to account for the pressures faced by
prosecutors to have high conviction rates. See Henning, supra note 113, at 252-53 (urging the
Supreme Court's view of prosecutors fails to account for the substantial pressure that prosecutors
face). While not all prosecutors are elected officials, they still possess a vested interest in conviction
rates, as they are used as an evaluation or job performance measure. Id at 253.
140. See DAVIS, supra note 124, at 127 (explaining some prosecutors may be emboldened to act
unethically by the harmless error rule because they can be sure their convictions will not be
overturned if the evidence supports the defendant's guilt); Henning, supra note 113, at 242 (discussing
a 2003 study conducted by the Center for Public Integrity of over 11,000 cases of prosecutorial
misconduct that revealed approximately 2,000 cases were overturned, and while misconduct was
found to have occurred in a number of other cases, courts refused to overturn the conviction based
on the harmless error ule); Starr, supra note 136, at 1514 (criticizing the appellate remedy for
violations of procedure-reversal and retrial-because, as a result of the harmless error doctrine, it is
so rarely granted as prosecutorial misconduct is almost always considered harmless error).
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as the integrity of our criminal justice system.141 Some legal scholars call
for modification and reform to the concept of prosecutorial immunity'4
or suggest that prosecutors be subject to, at least, qualified immunity.143
XII. CONCLUSION
Attorney-client communications should be afforded the utmost
protection due to the sensitive nature of the information relayed and the
need for clients to feel comfortable when speaking to their attorney. The
importance of confidentiality and trust in the attorney-client relationship
has been recognized by society and our legal system from the time of our
nation's founding. State officials and prosecutors should not be allowed to
continually get away with violations of the attorney-client privilege or gain
an unfair advantage as a result of those violations. The legal system simply
would not function properly without a fiercely protected attorney-client
privilege.
141. The abandonment of ethical behavior by prosecutors is detrimental to the criminal justice
system as it undermines society's confidence in its integrity. See Henning, supra note 113, at 251
(commenting on the importance of holding prosecutors accountable for unethical conduct for the
sake of maintaining "the integrity of the judicial system"); see also Bazelon, supra note 115, at 391
(addressing the serious problem that prosecutorial misconduct has the ability to undermine the
integrity of the entire criminal justice system); Johns, supra note 53, at 125 (proposing the absolute
immunity of prosecutors is against public policy because most prosecutors do not answer for their
unethical conduct; thus, it dilutes society's faith in the criminal justice system).
142. Much of the criticism surrounding the absolute civil immunity of prosecutors is concerned
with the changing legal landscape. Critics note the Supreme Court in Imbler justified absolute
immunity of prosecutors based on old common law. Some scholars advocate that the policy
concerns voiced by the court in Imbler, no longer carry as much weight. See Henning, supra note 113,
at 240 (challenging the reasoning in Imbler because the legal landscape has changed drastically and
justifications based on the common law of 1871 can no longer be supported); Zacharias & Green,
supra note 134, at 11 (analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Imbler); see also Johns, supra note 53,
at 108 (emphasizing in 1871, the American criminal justice system bore little resemblance to the
criminal justice system we know today).
143. See Henning, supra note 113, at 265 (proposing a compromise that would limit the class of
plaintiffs who would be entitled to bring suit against prosecutors after a showing of actual innocence,
and only then could a suit be brought against a prosecutor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Zacharias &
Green, supra note 134, at 58 (advocating a competence rule should somehow be implemented into
ethics codes or statutes, which would hold prosecutors accountable for their actions and assist
regulators in pursuing the core goal that prosecutors seek just results); see also Johns, spra note 53, at
107 (expressing qualified immunity should apply in all cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
because it is supported by both history and public policy, it would shield the honest prosecutor from
frivolous litigation, and it would afford real victims a remedy when prosecutors have intentionally
violated any clearly established Constitutional guarantees). But see Starr, supra note 136, at 1518-19
(advocating sentence reduction as a better remedy for prosecutorial misconduct than allowing
prosecutors to be amenable to civil suit because of the high costs of civil litigation and the prevalent
poverty of criminal defendants).
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The plaintiffs in Austin Lauyers Guild v. Securus Technologies, Inc. should be
afforded the injunctive and declaratory relief they seek. Additionally, the
court must consider taking action against prosecutors who have used
illegally obtained information to win their cases. While prosecutors are
generally immune from civil liability, they could face professional discipline
from the State Bar of Texas for breaching their Bar-appointed ethical
duties. This case provides a prime opportunity for the legal community to
reconsider the current state of prosecutorial immunity and to evaluate its
impact on the ethical aspects of the criminal justice system.
